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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
AIRBNB, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, 
Defendant. 
 
Case No. 3:16-cv-03615-JD   
 
 
ORDER RE  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Re: Dkt. No. 50 
 
Plaintiffs Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”) and HomeAway, Inc. (“HomeAway”) seek a preliminary 
injunction barring enforcement of a City and County of San Francisco ordinance that makes it a 
misdemeanor to provide booking services for unregistered rental units.  The parties agreed that an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary and the Court took oral argument on the motion on October 
6, 2016.  The injunction is denied on the primary grounds urged by plaintiffs, but further 
proceedings are warranted on an issue relating to fair enforcement.   
BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of San Francisco’s effort to regulate aspects of the “sharing economy” 
for accommodation rentals.  Airbnb is a San Francisco-based company that operates an Internet 
website through which “guests” can connect with “hosts” to enter into agreements to rent 
accommodations on a short- or long-term basis.  Dkt. No. 50 at 3; Dkt. No. 52 ¶¶ 1, 2.  Airbnb 
does not own, manage or operate any of the host properties, and is not a party to the rental 
agreements.  Dkt. No. 50 at 3; Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 4.  It does not charge an upfront fee for hosts to post a 
listing on its website, and does not run banner ads or other forms of advertising next to the listings.  
Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 72 at 18:5-6.  Airbnb makes money by charging hosts and guests a 
service fee that is a percentage based on the cost of the rental.  Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 8.  Airbnb has been 
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phenomenally successful nationally and internationally since its inception in 2008.  HomeAway 
also features an Internet website that operates in part on the same business model.  Dkt. No. 72 at 
4:11-14. 
An important feature of plaintiffs’ websites is that content for the rental listings is driven 
entirely by hosts.  Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 72 at 18:13-15.  The posting process is automated and 
requires the host to fill in some required fields, but plaintiffs do not verify, review or edit the 
information provided by the host, and do not contribute content of their own to the listing.  Dkt. 
No. 52 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 72 at 17:2-25. 
The ordinance plaintiffs challenge is San Francisco’s most recent approach to regulating 
short-term rentals.  Between 1981 and 2014, San Francisco effectively banned “tourist or 
transient” rentals out of concerns over losing affordable permanent housing stock.  Dkt. No. 57  
at 2.  In 2015, San Francisco changed course and enacted Ordinance 218-14, which lifted the ban 
and provides “an exception for permanent residents to the prohibition on short-term residential 
rentals under certain conditions.”  Id.  One of the main conditions is that a host register a residence 
with San Francisco before making it available as a short-term rental.  Id.; Dkt. No. 60-1 Exh. A.  
Registration requires proof of liability insurance and compliance with municipal codes, usage 
reporting, tax payments and other conditions.  Dkt. No. 49 ¶¶ 30, 31.  San Francisco also enacted 
Ordinance 130-15 to create the Office of Short-Term Residential Rental Administration and 
Enforcement (“OSTR”), which administers the registration and other requirements.  Dkt. No. 57 
at 3; Dkt. No. 60 ¶ 6.   
Taken together, these ordinances broke new ground in San Francisco by legalizing short-
term rentals of properties that are registered with the OSTR.  Plaintiffs do not challenge Ordinance 
218-14 or Ordinance 130-15 in any way, and they agree that a residential unit must be lawfully 
registered before being rented on a short-term basis.  Dkt. No. 72 at 14:21-15:1; see generally Dkt. 
Nos. 50, 64.   
According to San Francisco, compliance with the registration requirement has been spotty.  
Dkt. No. 57 at 4.  As of November 2015, for example, San Francisco had received only 1,082 
short-term rental registration applications while Airbnb listed 5,378 unique short-term rental hosts 
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in San Francisco, which points to a registration rate of just 20% even without including 
HomeAway and other similar services.  Id.; Dkt. No. 51-7 at 14.  By March 2016, the ratio was 
1,647 registered out of 7,046 listed -- a registration rate of approximately 25%.  Dkt. No. 57 at 4; 
Dkt. No. 51-7 at 14.  In April 2016, San Francisco’s Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office 
reported that enforcement of the registration requirement was “hampered by the City’s lack of 
information” because short-term rentals “operate in private residences without any commercial 
signage posted” and because hosting platforms “do not disclose addresses or booking information 
about their hosts.”  Dkt. No. 51-7 at 7.   
In an apparent response to this situation, San Francisco enacted Ordinance 104-16 (the 
“Original Ordinance”), which amended Chapter 41A of the Administrative Code.  Dkt. No. 51-1.  
As San Francisco acknowledges, this ordinance directly touched upon content posted on the 
Internet by imposing requirements designed to prevent the publication of listings for rentals that 
were not lawfully registered.  Dkt. No. 57 at 4.  In effect, this ordinance would have required 
companies like plaintiffs to actively monitor and verify content provided by third-party hosts 
before publication, at the peril of being held criminally and civilly liable if a listing for an 
unregistered unit was published on their websites.  See Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3-5.   
Promptly after the Original Ordinance was enacted in June 2016, Airbnb filed this lawsuit 
and moved for a preliminary injunction.  Dkt. Nos. 1, 3.  HomeAway was granted leave to 
intervene as a plaintiff.  Dkt. No. 35.  But as the Court prepared to launch the injunction 
proceedings, San Francisco requested a stay to allow the Board of Supervisors to consider 
proposed amendments that might “significantly alter plaintiffs’ obligations under San Francisco 
law.”  Dkt. No. 31-1; Dkt. No. 36. 
On August 2, 2016, the Board of Supervisors passed Ordinance 178-16 (the “Ordinance”), 
which is the law at issue in this lawsuit.  Dkt. No. 57 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 58-1 Exh. C.  Although 
styled as an amendment of the Original Ordinance, the Ordinance is significantly different from its 
predecessor and in practical measure amounts to a new law.  Of particular import here, it abandons 
any requirements or restrictions on the publication of a rental listing.  Compare Dkt. No. 51-1 at 4 
with Dkt. No. 50-2 at 3-4.  The Ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to collect a fee for providing 
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booking services for the rental of an unregistered unit.  Dkt. No. 50-2 at 3-4.  It became law 
without the Mayor’s signature on August 11, 2016.  Dkt. No. 40 at 1. 
The operative terms and definitions of the Ordinance are critical to the resolution of the 
injunction motion, and deserve close attention.  As an initial matter, the Ordinance defines a 
“Booking Service” in pertinent part as “any reservation and/or payment service provided by a 
person or entity that facilitates a short-term rental transaction between an Owner . . . and a 
prospective tourist or transient user . . . for which the person or entity collects or receives . . . a fee 
in connection with the reservation and/or payment services.”  Dkt. No. 50-2 at 2.  It defines a 
“Hosting Platform” as a “person or entity that participates in the short-term rental business by 
providing, and collecting or receiving a fee for, Booking Services.”  Id.  The Ordinance expressly 
states that a Hosting Platform includes more than just “an online platform” and encompasses non-
Internet based services as well.  Id.  Drawing these elements together, the Ordinance permits a 
Hosting Platform to “provide, and collect a fee for, Booking Services in connection with short-
term rentals for Residential Units located in the City and County of San Francisco only when 
those Residential Units are lawfully registered on the Short Term Residential Rental Registry” at 
the time of rental.  Id. at 3-4.  The OSTR interprets “lawfully registered” to mean that a host has 
obtained a registration number from the OSTR.  Dkt. No. 60 ¶ 12.  A violation constitutes a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to six months.  Dkt. 
No. 50-2 at 2-3.  The Ordinance also imposes reporting and other requirements, but the Booking 
Service terms and provisions are at the heart of plaintiffs’ lawsuit.   
On August 17, 2016, San Francisco filed a “Notice of Completion of Amendment Process” 
and took the position that the litigation should proceed.  Dkt. No. 40.  At a status conference on 
August 22, 2016, San Francisco agreed to stay enforcement of the Ordinance pending the Court’s 
disposition of plaintiffs’ renewed preliminary injunction motion.  Dkt. No. 44.  Plaintiffs jointly 
filed the renewed motion on September 6, 2016.  Dkt. No. 50.   
Plaintiffs challenge the Ordinance on three main grounds:  (1) “preemption” under the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”); (2) content-based speech restriction 
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under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) imposition of criminal strict 
liability.  See generally Dkt. Nos. 49, 50.  
DISCUSSION 
I. Preliminary Injunction Standards 
A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”  Winter 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).  “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, 
and that an injunction is in the public interest.”  Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).  Our circuit applies a “sliding scale” 
approach in which “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger 
showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.”  Id.; see also Arc of California 
v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2014).  But “at an irreducible minimum,” the party 
seeking an injunction “must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions 
serious enough to require litigation.”  Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation omitted).   
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
A. CDA Section 230(c)  
Plaintiffs’ lead argument is that the Ordinance is preempted by the CDA.  Dkt. No. 50  
at 10.  Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  The CDA includes an express preemption clause, which provides 
that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).   
Our circuit holds that Section 230(c)(1) precludes liability for claims involving “(1) a 
provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state 
law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information 
content provider.”  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal 
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quotation omitted).  There is no dispute in this case that plaintiffs provide an interactive computer 
service or that the information in their rental listings comes directly and exclusively from third-
party users.  Consequently, plaintiffs’ Section 230 challenge turns on whether the Ordinance 
“inherently requires the court to treat” them as “the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by 
another.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).   
Plaintiffs’ argument is straightforward.  In their view, the threat of a criminal penalty for 
providing and receiving a fee for Booking Services for an unregistered unit requires that they 
actively monitor and police listings by third parties to verify registration.  Plaintiffs contend that is 
tantamount to treating them as a publisher because it involves the traditional publication functions 
of “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-
party content.”  Id.; see also Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (any activity “that can be boiled down to 
deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune 
under section 230”).   
But the Ordinance does not threaten the liability plaintiffs fear.  As the text and plain 
meaning of the Ordinance demonstrate, it in no way treats plaintiffs as the publishers or speakers 
of the rental listings provided by hosts.  It does not regulate what can or cannot be said or posted 
in the listings.  It creates no obligation on plaintiffs’ part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the 
content supplied by hosts.  To the contrary, as San Francisco has emphasized in its briefs and at 
oral argument, plaintiffs are perfectly free to publish any listing they get from a host and to collect 
fees for doing so -- whether the unit is lawfully registered or not -- without threat of prosecution or 
penalty under the Ordinance.  Dkt. No. 57 at 9; Dkt. No. 72 at 25:20-24.  The Ordinance holds 
plaintiffs liable only for their own conduct, namely for providing, and collecting a fee for, 
Booking Services in connection with an unregistered unit.  Dkt. No. 50-2 at 3; Dkt. No. 57 at 9.  
This regulation of plaintiffs’ own conduct “does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information 
or who is a ‘speaker.’”  City of Chicago, Ill. v. Stubhub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting Section 230(c) challenge to municipal tax on Internet auction sites).   
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Plaintiffs recognize that the Ordinance is not, on its face, directed to content or speech. 
Dkt. No. 72 at 8:25-9:11.  In an effort to surmount that hurdle, plaintiffs reel off a long list of 
federal and state cases that have broadly applied Section 230(c).  Dkt. No. 50 at 10-18.  While it is 
certainly true that these cases found preemption, they are all readily distinguishable from the facts 
here.  The cases plaintiffs rely on involved claims and regulations that would have imposed 
liability on the service provider as a publisher or speaker of content supplied by a third party.  In 
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266-68 (W.D. Wash. 2012), for 
example, the plaintiff was “the second largest online advertising service” in the country, and 
challenged a Washington state law that made it a felony offense to display content advertising or 
offering the sexual abuse of a minor.  In that circumstance, where the crime expressly consisted of 
an act of publication, the court had no trouble finding preemption because the state law would 
necessarily hold Backpage.com liable for publishing advertising content supplied by third parties.  
Id. at 1273.  The same result was reached in Goddard v. Google, No. C 08-2738 JF (PVT), 2008 
WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).  The plaintiff there sought to hold Google liable for 
injuries from “clicking on web-based advertisements” hosted by Google.  Id. at *1.  The court 
found that “[p]laintiff claims in essence that she was harmed because Google hosted certain online 
content” and that her claims “would effectively hold Google liable for its publication of third-party 
content in contravention of § 230.”  Id. at *5.  In Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st 
Cir. 2016), victims of child sex trafficking sought to hold Backpage.com liable because its “rules 
and processes governing the content of advertisements are designed to encourage sex trafficking.”  
The First Circuit found that these claims “[w]ithout exception” encompassed Backpage’s editorial 
and publication “decisions about how to treat postings” by third parties, and were therefore 
precluded.  Id. at 21-22.  In addition, the First Circuit appears to take a more expansive view of 
Section 230(c) preemption than the Ninth Circuit.  And in another case plaintiffs cite involving 
Backpage.com, the law at issue expressly criminalized the sale of or the offer to sell an 
advertisement for commercial sexual abuse of a minor.  Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. 
Supp. 2d 805, 816-17 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).   
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Plaintiffs’ other case citations are inapposite for the same reason -- they all turned on facts 
showing that the service provider would necessarily be held liable as the publisher or speaker of 
online content provided by another.  Much more germane, and of course controlling, are the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decisions denying preemption under Section 230(c).  These cases acknowledge 
Congress’s goals in Section 230(c) “to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over 
the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material,” and to 
preserve the “vibrant and competitive free market” for interactive computer services.  Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1099-1100 (internal quotation omitted).  But they also hold, contrary to plaintiffs’ position, 
that Section 230(c) does not provide limitless immunity for online activity or conduct related to it.  
Congress enacted Section 230 primarily “to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure 
to remove offensive content.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.  Section 230(c) does not create 
“a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100; 
see also City of Chicago, 624 F.3d at 366 (same).  “To ‘provid[e] immunity every time a website 
uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the statute].’”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1100 (quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171)(brackets in original).   
The correct test, then, is not whether a challenged activity merely bears some connection to 
online content.  It is whether a regulation or claim “inherently requires the court to treat” the 
“interactive computer service” as a publisher or speaker of information provided by another.  
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  Applying this test, our circuit has denied preemption when a regulation 
or claim does not turn on holding an Internet service liable for posting or failing to remove content 
provided by a third party.  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851 (denying preemption of duty to warn 
relating to defendant’s online practices); see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (denying preemption 
of promissory estoppel claim relating to online postings because “Barnes does not seek to hold 
Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counter-party to a 
contract”).  So too here, where the challenged Ordinance regulates plaintiffs’ own conduct as 
Booking Service providers and cares not a whit about what is or is not featured on their websites. 
Plaintiffs’ other main CDA argument draws on a preemption decision far removed from 
the CDA and Section 230(c).  Plaintiffs argue that a 2012 Supreme Court opinion, National Meat 
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Association v. Harris, 132 S.Ct. 965 (2012), sets a general rule that a preemption analysis must 
assess the “practical effect” of the challenged ordinance and how it “operates in fact” to determine 
whether it runs afoul of a bar.  Dkt. No. 64 at 8; Dkt. No. 72 at 8:4-12.  In that case, the Supreme 
Court struck down a California state law that imposed criminal penalties on slaughterhouses for 
selling products from nonambulatory animals for human consumption.  National Meat, 132 S.Ct. 
at 975.  It held that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”) broadly preempts state laws that 
purport to impose any additional or different standards on slaughterhouse facilities or operations, 
including the handling of nonambulatory animals.  Id. at 970-71.  The federal statute did not 
explicitly refer to sales activities, and proponents of the California law tried to avoid preemption 
by saying it regulated only those practices.  Id. at 972.  But the Court disagreed.  It held that the 
“inevitable effect” of the sales ban “is to make sure that slaughterhouses remove nonambulatory 
pigs” from their operations.  Id.  Allowing that to stand would “make a mockery of the FMIA 
preemption provision.”  Id. at 972-73.   
Plaintiffs argue that this same reasoning applies here.  While they acknowledge that the 
Ordinance does not on its face treat them as publishers or speakers of third party content, Dkt. 
No. 72 at 8:25-9:11, they insist that it will have the practical effect of compelling them to monitor 
listings and remove postings for unregistered rentals.  Dkt. No. 64 at 11; Dkt. No. 72 at 14:6-16.  
They point to the sequence of events leading up to the Ordinance as suggestive evidence.  Dkt. 
No. 50 at 6-7.  The Original Ordinance would have treated plaintiffs as liable for content provided 
by users; San Francisco withdrew that law essentially as a concession that it would not survive 
review under Section 230(c).  Id.  The current Ordinance, in plaintiffs’ view, is designed to 
achieve the same impermissible end through indirect means.  Dkt. No. 50 at 19; Dkt. No. 64 at 1. 
This argument is not well taken.  As an initial matter, plaintiffs raised National Meat for 
the first time in a reply brief, and a case can be made that the Court should decline to consider it 
for that reason alone.  United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006); FT Travel -- New 
York, LLC v. Your Travel Center, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2015).  The Court 
addresses it anyway for the sake of completeness and because the risk that plaintiffs have unfairly 
sandbagged San Francisco is not substantial.   
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Plaintiffs’ problem is that they have failed to submit evidence showing that the Ordinance 
will in fact inevitably or perforce require them to monitor, remove or do anything at all to the 
content that hosts post.  Airbnb says the Ordinance will make screening listings for registration 
status “very likely” but stops short of saying that it would be a necessity.  Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 25.  
Plaintiffs might indeed voluntarily choose to screen listings, and the facts show that Airbnb 
already reviews and “discretionarily removes listings” for other reasons.  Id. ¶ 14.  But the 
Ordinance does not compel that result.  It may be equally likely that plaintiffs will consider other 
measures unrelated to editing user content, such as posting a notice to users that they can provide 
Booking Services in San Francisco only for units that are lawfully registered and verified as such.  
See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851 (approving warning notice on website).  Or they may 
consider charging fees for publishing listings, rather than for facilitating transactions -- a measure 
San Francisco concedes is lawful.  See Dkt. No. 57 at 14 (“Under the Ordinance, Hosting 
Platforms are free to charge a fee for posting a listing (even a listing for an unregistered unit) on 
their websites.”).  The record before the Court simply does not support a finding that the 
Ordinance will inevitably or necessarily treat plaintiffs as publishers or speakers of user content, 
or force them to edit or remove postings.   
Plaintiffs also slight the fact that preemption under the FMIA is different from and 
potentially much broader than under Section 230(c).  Compare CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No 
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that 
is inconsistent with this section.”) (emphasis added) with FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 678 (barring a state 
from imposing requirements “in addition to, or different than . . . requirements within the scope” 
of the FMIA -- even if the requirements do not conflict).  It is the scope of Section 230(c) that 
governs here, and the Ninth Circuit has expressly cautioned against applying it “beyond its narrow 
language and its purpose.”  Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.  Requirements that might have an 
incidental ripple effect on Internet postings are not barred under the CDA.  “Congress has not 
provided an all purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on the 
internet” even when a claim “might have a marginal chilling effect on internet publishing 
businesses.”  Id.   
Case 3:16-cv-03615-JD   Document 74   Filed 11/08/16   Page 10 of 18
 11 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
Other factors also counsel against plaintiffs’ reading of National Meat.  Cases that have 
construed National Meat in contexts outside the FMIA have limited it to its particular facts.  The 
Second Circuit, for example, declined to apply it to find preemption of  a New York state law 
regulating the sale of certain tobacco products.  See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. LLC v. City 
of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 434 (2d Cir. 2013).  The circuit held that “it does not follow that every 
sales ban . . . should be regarded as a backdoor” attempt to regulate conduct upstream from the 
actual sale of goods or services.  Id.  In addition, the broad reading of National Meat that plaintiffs 
urge would give them a windfall over potential competitors.  The Ordinance is intended to apply 
to all hosting services, whether online or not.  Dkt. No. 50-2 at 2.  Plaintiffs’ backdoor argument 
under Section 230(c) would carve out favorable treatment for themselves, as online companies, 
that booking service providers not based on the Internet would not enjoy.  See Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1164 n.15 (CDA immunity should not be applied to “give online businesses an unfair 
advantage over their real-world counterparts”).   
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success or a serious question on 
preemption under Section 230(c).  Consequently, an injunction is denied on that ground.   
 B. First Amendment  
Plaintiffs also challenge the Ordinance under the First Amendment.  Plaintiffs say the 
Ordinance triggers First Amendment scrutiny because its practical effect will be to burden speech, 
and that it is subject to “heightened” scrutiny because it restricts particular content, namely 
advertisements for unlawfully registered rentals.  Dkt. No. 50 at 20-22; Dkt. No. 72 at 18:22-25.  
These contentions are unavailing.   
The initial inquiry under the First Amendment is whether the Ordinance primarily targets 
speech or speakers, or is better construed as an economic regulation.  “[R]estrictions on protected 
expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive 
conduct,” and “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or 
conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 
567 (2011).  Consequently, as our circuit has held, the “threshold question is whether conduct with 
a ‘significant expressive element’ drew the legal remedy or the ordinance has the inevitable effect 
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of ‘singling out those engaged in expressive activity.’”  Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 
Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 
706-07 (1986)).   
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Ordinance meets either of these threshold 
conditions.  A Booking Service as defined and targeted by the Ordinance is a business transaction 
to secure a rental, not conduct with a significant expressive element.  See Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 
803 F.3d at 408 (“decision of a franchisor and a franchisee to form a business relationship and 
their resulting business activities” not expressive conduct).  The Ordinance also does not single 
out those engaged in expressive activity “such as newspapers or advocacy organizations.”  Id.  No 
specific speaker is targeted for disparate or unfavorable treatment under the Ordinance.  Although 
the Ordinance does note that Hosting Platforms are “usually” online platforms, the law is not 
limited to entities operating on the Internet.  Dkt. No. 50-2 at 2.  And plaintiffs have not 
established that the Ordinance was “motivated by a desire to suppress speech.”  Int’l Franchise 
Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 409.  The legislative record plaintiffs present indicates that the Ordinance was 
adopted to help enforce compliance with the registration requirement by ensuring that “hosting 
platforms do business with law-abiding hosts.”  See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51-3 at 1 (legislative remarks 
of Supervisor Campos).  In light of these factors, the Court finds that the Ordinance is directed at 
specific business transactions and practices, and “not to any message the businesses express.”  
Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 409.   
Plaintiffs contend that two Supreme Court cases require a different outcome:  Sorrell, 564 
U.S. at 564, which struck down a Vermont statute that restricted the sale, disclosure and use of 
pharmacy records revealing doctors’ drug prescribing practices so that “recipient speakers” such 
as pharmaceutical companies could not receive or “use the information for marketing”; and Simon 
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), which 
invalidated a New York statute, the “Son of Sam” law, that would have restricted a criminal’s 
right to profit from literary or other works based on the crime.  But neither case leads to the result 
plaintiffs seek.  The Vermont law in Sorrell on its face “disfavor[ed] marketing, that is, speech 
with a particular content,” and “[m]ore than that, . . . disfavor[ed] specific speakers, namely 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers.”  564 U.S. at 564.  Consequently, the Supreme Court found that 
those were “content- and speaker-based” restrictions that did not withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.  Id. at 563-80.  The New York law in Simon & Schuster was also a “content-based 
statute” because it singled out income derived from classically “expressive activity” (e.g., books, 
movies, magazine articles, or other “expression[s] of [an] accused or convicted person’s thoughts, 
feelings, opinions or emotions” about the crime), and was directed only at “works with a specified 
content” (i.e., relating to the “reenactment of [the] crime”).  502 U.S. at 110, 116.  These core First 
Amendment concerns are not implicated by the Ordinance here.   
Plaintiffs’ other citations are similarly inapposite.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 
S. Ct. 2218 (2015), for example, invalidated under the First Amendment a municipal code that 
imposed disparate restrictions on the display of outdoor signs based on the speech content of the 
signs.  Signs expressing “political” messages or directing passersby to religious, charitable or 
other non-profit organization events were subjected to different and more burdensome regulations 
than other signs.  Id. at 2224-25.  The Court invalidated this “Sign Code” under strict scrutiny 
precisely because it improperly imposed “content-based restrictions on speech.”  Id. at 2231-32.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), struck down a Virginia 
law that “made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publication, to encourage or 
prompt the procuring of an abortion.”  Id. at 811.  And, as previously discussed, McKenna, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1268, addressed a Washington law that made it a felony to publish, disseminate, or 
display advertisements for a commercial sex act “that includes the depiction of a minor.”  The 
common denominator in these and the other cases plaintiffs have proffered is that they involved 
laws that plainly targeted and disfavored specific speech content or speakers.  The law in this case 
stands apart as one that targets nonexpressive commercial conduct rather than speech content.   
Plaintiffs’ fallback position is that the Ordinance is a restriction on speech in the “disguise” 
of a conduct regulation.  Dkt. No. 50 at 21; Dkt. No. 64 at 10-11.  But this argument is little more 
than an expression of the widely recognized condition that speech and conduct fall on a 
continuum, and a law that affects one will often affect the other.  “Every civil and criminal remedy 
imposes some conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities.”  Arcara, 478 U.S. at 
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706 (citing as an example that “a thief who is sent to prison might complain that his First 
Amendment right to speak in public places has been infringed because of the confinement”); see 
also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570 (“It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every 
activity a person undertakes -- for example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a 
shopping mall -- but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the 
First Amendment.”).  It does not follow, then, that every sanction under a law is subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny “simply because each particular remedy will have some effect on the First 
Amendment activities of those subject to sanction.”  Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706.  Unlike the cases 
plaintiffs cite, the Ordinance here enacts “restrictions directed at commerce or conduct,” namely 
the booking of rentals for unregistered units.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567.  To the limited extent the 
Ordinance might be said to affect speech, the impact or burden is purely incidental.  Id.  Because 
the Ordinance “was not motivated by a desire to suppress speech, the conduct at issue is not . . . 
expression, and the ordinance does not have the effect of targeting expressive activity,” Int’l 
Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 409, the First Amendment is “not implicated” at all.  Arcara, 478 
U.S. at 707.   
This is enough to end plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, but even if the Ordinance is 
reviewed as a restriction on commercial speech, it survives scrutiny.  To the extent the Ordinance 
can be said to affect speech at all, it involves speech that “does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction” and consequently is “commercial speech.”  Lone Star Security and Video, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1198 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).  
Plaintiffs agree with this approach.  Dkt. No. 50 at 21.   
As a preliminary matter to the commercial speech discussion, the parties dispute the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.  Our circuit recently resolved this issue by reaffirming after 
publication of Reed and Sorrell that commercial speech, even if content-based, need only 
withstand intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n 
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).  See Lone Star, 827 F.3d at 1198 n.3.  In any event, the 
level of scrutiny does not drive the First Amendment analysis here.  Our circuit applies a four-part 
test from Central Hudson to decide commercial speech challenges, and the “threshold 
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requirement” is that the speech must be related to lawful activity.  Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 
709 F.3d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 2013) (“we first evaluate whether the affected speech is misleading or 
related to unlawful activity.”).  If it is, the commercial speech at issue is not protected by the First 
Amendment and no further analysis is required.  Id. at 820-21.   
Central Hudson’s legality requirement has “traditionally focused on the content of the 
affected speech -- i.e., whether the speech proposes an illegal transaction.”  Valle Del Sol, 709 
F.3d at 821.  This is so because the Supreme Court has consistently held that speech proposing an 
illegal transaction is excluded from First Amendment protection.  See United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973) (“Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an 
ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest 
supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the 
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”).  Consequently, 
the determinative question is “whether ‘the transactions proposed in the forbidden 
[communication] are themselves illegal in any way.’”  Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 821 (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976)).  If they 
are, the speech is unprotected and the government may freely regulate it.  Fla. Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); Washington Mercantile Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687, 691 
(9th Cir. 1984) (affirming state ban on advertisements for drug paraphernalia when sale of 
paraphernalia is illegal).   
These well-established principles forestall plaintiffs’ argument.  As plaintiffs expressly 
agree, it is illegal in San Francisco to rent a unit that is not lawfully registered.  Dkt. No. 72 at 
14:21-15:1.  They cannot seek, then, to set aside on First Amendment grounds an ordinance that 
they contend would restrict their ability to communicate offers to rent unregistered units.  
Plaintiffs’ reply arguments do not point to a different outcome.  For example, plaintiffs quote 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1281, for the proposition that “[t]he third-party publication of offers 
to engage in illegal transactions does not fall within ‘well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech’ that fall outside of First Amendment protection.”  Dkt. No. 64 at 11.  But in Pittsburgh 
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Press, the Supreme Court expressly stated that “[w]e have no doubt that a newspaper 
constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting 
prostitutes.”  413 U.S. at 388.  Plaintiffs also contend that “First Amendment scrutiny [is] required 
unless ‘the ad on its face’ is unlawful.”  Dkt. No. 64 at 11 (quoting Braun v. Soldier of Fortune 
Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (11th Cir. 1992)).  But Braun does not stand for that 
proposition.  In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that as a matter of state tort law, it was 
appropriate to impose liability only if an advertisement “on its face” would have alerted the 
publisher of the proposed illegality.  968 F.2d at 1118.  As a matter of First Amendment law, 
however, the court confirmed that “[i]t is well-settled that the First Amendment does not protect 
commercial speech ‘related to illegal activity,’ and, thus, there is no constitutional interest in 
publishing personal service ads that solicit criminal activity.”  Id. at 1117 (citations omitted).   
Plaintiffs also make a cursory argument in their reply brief that the Ordinance offends the 
First Amendment because it requires Hosting Platforms to file a monthly declaration of 
compliance with the Ordinance and to keep records of facilitated transactions.  Dkt. No. 50 at 21.  
This is unpersuasive.  The filing and records requirements relate solely to business transactions.  
They do not regulate or restrict any speech (e.g., there is no requirement that Hosting Platforms 
keep records of listings they publish) or any speaker based on the content or views expressed, and 
so do not trigger any First Amendment concerns.   
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success or a serious question under the 
First Amendment.  Consequently, an injunction is denied on that ground. 
 C. Imposition of Criminal Strict Liability 
Plaintiffs’ final attack on the Ordinance is that it purportedly imposes criminal liability 
without proof of scienter.  Dkt. No. 50 at 25-26.  In plaintiffs’ view, the imposition of strict 
liability for the dissemination of information is impermissible even when the content is 
unprotected under the First Amendment.  Id.  While several points can be made in response, this 
challenge does not require extended discussion.  San Francisco has expressly accepted the 
imputation of a scienter requirement “[b]ecause scienter is commonly understood to be an element 
of criminal liability.”  Dkt. No. 57 at 25.  And nothing in the record before the Court shows a 
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legislative intent on San Francisco’s part to dispense with mens rea as an element.  See Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994).  The Court will construe the Ordinance as requiring 
scienter, and San Francisco will be held to that interpretation.   
Plaintiffs also contend the Ordinance is fatally ambiguous.  Dkt. No. 50 at 26-27.  They 
say, for example, that “lawfully registered” is unclear because registration involves a “multitude” 
of requirements ranging from insurance to tax reports.  Id.  And that “at the time it is rented” is 
unclear because it does not specify clearly enough the moment in time that is covered.  Id. at 27.  
But San Francisco again has solved plaintiffs’ concerns by declaring that “lawfully registered” 
means the host has a registration certificate, and that “at the time it is rented” means when the 
booking transaction occurs.  Dkt. No. 60 ¶¶ 12-13.  Those constructions also bind San Francisco 
and are enough at this stage to alleviate the concern that the Ordinance might fail “to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it prescribes” or invite 
“arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 634 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (citing Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.1984)).  Plaintiffs are 
certainly free to raise these arguments in more concrete terms if enforcement proceedings 
implicate them in the future.   
III. Further Proceedings 
The CDA, the First Amendment, and scienter are the three main grounds on which 
plaintiffs moved for an injunction.  They have not demonstrated the “irreducible minimum” of a 
likelihood of success on the merits of these arguments or questions serious enough to require 
litigation, and so the injunction is properly denied without consideration of the other Winter 
factors.  Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1111.   
Plaintiffs have, however, arguably raised another possible ground for an injunction.  
Liability and penalties under the Ordinance turn on whether a rental is lawfully registered, but as 
plaintiffs point out, and San Francisco forthrightly concedes, OSTR currently does not have in 
place a procedure or mechanism for prompt and effective registration verification.  At most, San 
Francisco mentions several possibilities along with the representation that OSTR “is willing to 
engage with Hosting Platforms as partners to develop a mechanism.”  Dkt. No. 60 ¶ 11.   
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Plaintiffs have understandably expressed concerns about the lack of a functional 
verification system while they face potential criminal sanctions under the Ordinance.  The issue 
came up at oral argument and was referenced in the briefs, but the Court has not yet had the 
benefit of a full discussion of the merits.  Consequently, the Court defers determination of whether 
a preliminary injunction should issue on this ground pending submission of supplemental briefs by 
the parties.  A status conference is set for Thursday, November 17, 2016, at 10:00 a.m.  The 
parties should be prepared to set a briefing schedule and should try to work out a joint proposal 
before the conference.  If plaintiffs would prefer not to pursue this issue, they should advise the 
Court promptly. 
The Court anticipates that San Francisco will continue to abide by the stay of enforcement 
of the Ordinance until this question is resolved.   
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  November 8, 2016  
 
  
JAMES DONATO 
United States District Judge 
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